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Abstract
On 31st January 2020, the Italian cabinet declared a 6-month national emergency after the detection of the
first two COVID-19 positive cases in Rome, two Chinese tourists travelling from Wuhan. Between then
and the total lockdown introduced on 22nd March 2020 Italy was hit by an unprecedented crisis. In add-
ition to being the first European country to be heavily swept by the COVID-19 pandemic, Italy was the
first to introduce stringent lockdown measures. The SARS-CoV-2 outbreak and related COVID-19 pan-
demic have been the worst public health challenge endured in recent history by Italy. Two months since
the beginning of the first wave, the estimated excess deaths in Lombardy, the hardest hit region in the
country, reached a peak of more than 23,000 deaths. The extraordinary pressures exerted on the Italian
Servizio Sanitario Nazionale (SSN) inevitably leads to questions about its preparedness and the appropri-
ateness and effectiveness of responses implemented at both national and regional levels. The aim of the
paper is to critically review the Italian response to the COVID-19 crisis spanning from the first early acute
phases of the emergency (March–May 2020) to the relative stability of the epidemiological situation just
before the second outbreak in October 2020.
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1. Introduction
The SARS-CoV-2 outbreak and the related COVID-19 pandemic have been the worst public
health challenge in recent Italian history, placing extraordinary pressures on the country’s health
care and long-term care systems, and on the economy as a whole.
Between 31st January 2020, when a state of national emergency was declared after the detec-
tion of the first two COVID-19 cases in Rome, and the easing of the stringent lockdown restric-
tions at the beginning of June, Italy was ‘hit by nothing short of a tsunami of unprecedented
forces, punctuated by an incessant stream of deaths. […] Italy’s biggest crisis since World War
II’ (Pisano et al., 2020). Two months after the beginning of the first wave, the estimated excess
deaths in Lombardy, the hardest hit region in the country, reached a peak of more than
23,000 deaths, equivalent to an excess mortality of +118% compared to the average mortality
rate of the period 1 January–30 April 2015–2019 (Ghislandi et al., 2020; ISTAT, 2020).
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In this paper, we aim to critically review the Italian response to the COVID-19 crisis spanning
from the early acute phases of the emergency (March–May 2020) to the relative stability of the
epidemiological situation just before the second outbreak in October 2020. In what follows, we
first briefly describe how the Italian Servizio Sanitario Nazionale (SSN, National Health
Services) is organised and the preparedness of the SSN before the epidemic started. Second,
we describe the governance of the emergency set up by the government. Finally, we attempt a
first assessment of the effects that the COVID-19 crisis had on the Italian health care system, sep-
arately addressing supply-side and demand-side considerations.
2. Overview of the Italian SSN
The Italian SSN was established in 1978 on the principles of universal access and free health care.
The SSN is mostly financed through general taxation. In 2019, public health care expenditure was
74% of total health care expenditure (THE) and 6.5% of GDP. Private out-of-pocket payments
account for 23% of THE, one of the highest in Europe, with the remainder coming from private
health insurance. THE was 8.8% of GDP, in line with the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) average, but almost 1% below the European Union
(EU) (28) average and lower than most Western European countries; per capita spending was
3649 USD-PPP, 14% lower than the OECD average (Citoni et al., 2020).
Unlike other centrally managed national health care systems, the SSN has implemented a
decentralised model since the early 1990s with complementary responsibilities allocated to the
central and regional levels of government (Ferrè et al., 2014). The central government is respon-
sible to set the overall funding requirements, goals and priorities of the SSN, mainly through the
setting of ‘Essential Levels of Care’ (Livelli Essenziali di Assistenza, LEA) and by ensuring that the
health expenditure of each region does not exceed the allocated budget. Nineteen regions and two
autonomous provinces are responsible for the organisation and delivery of health care services –
primary and secondary care, public health and social care – within their territories. They are
allowed to do so with a high degree of administrative, political and also fiscal autonomy, e.g.
regions can levy additional taxes to finance health care. This decentralised model has basically
led to the development of 21 different regional/provincial health care sub-systems in Italy,
with significant differences in terms of organisational and governance models (Nuti et al., 2016).
Over the last two decades the Italian SSN has experienced continuous financial cuts, which
while guaranteeing financial sustainability, might have led to a number of negative and unin-
tended effects. A cap to personnel costs in 2004, for example, led to a depletion of health care
professionals’ competencies (Noto et al., 2020). The 2007 bail-out plans in some regions resulted
in the downsizing of hospital capacity, block of staff turnover and new co-payments on pharma-
ceutical expenditure (Bordignon and Turati, 2009; Piacenza and Turati, 2014). All of the above
led to the realisation that more resources needed to be injected in the SSN, as recognised in
the last national health plan ‘Patto per la salute 2019–2021’, issued in December 2019, just before
the COVID-19 crisis (Ministero della Salute, 2019).
3. National plan for preparation and response to an influenza pandemic
By the impact observed in the early stage of the emergency, it is plausible to believe that the pan-
demic caught the population, the local and national governments and even the international
organisations and public health experts largely unprepared. However, since the H5N1 avian influ-
enza re-emergence in the Far East in 2003, the risk of a flu pandemic in the country was seen as
concrete and persistent. In 2005, the WHO issued a list of recommendations (WHO, 2020) for
updating and developing a national pandemic plan, following which the Ministry of Health in
Italy developed a ‘National Plan for Preparation and Response to an Influenza Pandemic’
(Ministero della Salute, 2006), defining objectives and activities, agreed with the regions, to be
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carried out to prevent and cope with a future pandemic throughout the national territory. The
general objective of the plan was to strengthen preparedness for an epidemiological emergency
at the national and local levels, and more specifically to (i) quickly identify, confirm and describe
cases of influenza caused by new viral subtypes, in order to promptly recognise the onset of the
pandemic; (ii) minimise the risk of transmission and limit morbidity and mortality due to the
pandemic; (iii) reduce the impact of the pandemic on health and social services and ensure
the maintenance of essential services; (iv) ensure adequate training of personnel involved in
the response to the pandemic; (v) ensure up-to-date and timely information for decision makers,
health professionals, the media and the public and (vi) monitor the efficiency of the interventions
undertaken. However, the plan was never revised in the 14 years since its development. This
attracted strong criticisms, as reported also in the media (Puente, 2020).
A number of key intermediate steps were envisaged to achieve these objectives, which, as
unfortunately reported during the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic (de Maria; Palladino,
2020), remained largely unfulfilled. Even the Italian Prime Minister, on 24th February, threatened
to take back powers from the regions and autonomous provinces because they were ‘in charge of
implementing healthcare but not prepared to face a national emergency’ and complained about
the lack of application of ‘unspecified’ preparedness protocols (Carinci, 2020). This gap does not
come unexpected when considering that since 2001 in the allocation of the national health care
budget no more than 5% was earmarked for prevention, which also includes the pandemic pre-
paredness activities, with community and hospital care (51 and 44%, respectively in 2019) gaining
the lion share (CERGAS Bocconi, 2019).
More recently the Ministry of Health developed a new National Preparedness Plan (PanFlu
2021–2023), which identifies all the necessary actions that ought to be followed to avoid the
health care system being overwhelmed again (Ministero della Salute, 2021). It also includes the
possible responses to be taken in the event of a future epidemic, such as appropriate chain of
commands, prevention and control measures. Furthermore, the new plan includes an explicit
monitoring function of the implementation of the plan itself (Fassari, 2021).
4. Governing the emergency: who? when? how? why?
On 31st January 2020, the Italian Government declared a national emergency in order to be able
to face the incoming COVID-19 crisis. The most direct consequence of this act was that the
Department of Civil Protection, an operative branch of the Presidency of the Council of
Ministers, took up the important role of coordination and execution of the emergency interven-
tion. The Civil Protection is a highly regarded and reputable organisation, a reputation matured
through their long experience with dealing with earthquakes and other national disasters.
Additional committees and roles were also created to front the emergency. In particular and
following the timeline of events, on 3rd February, the Civil Protection Department set up a tech-
nical and scientific committee (hereafter CTS), comprising of high level civil servants from within
the Ministry of Health, the Istituto Superiore di Sanità (National Institute of Health, ISS), regional
governments and the same Civil Protection Department, as well as clinical experts (public health
experts, virologists and clinicians) to provide scientific advice to the government. The regional
governments of Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna and Piedmont, all at the epicentre of the
COVID-19 health crisis in Italy, also set up their own task forces and advisory committees.
Furthermore, on 17th March, to respond to the inadequate availability of both personal protec-
tion equipment (PPE) and ventilators, the Prime Minister appointed a commissioner in charge of
coordinating their centralised procurement. Finally, on 10th April, a ‘committee of experts in eco-
nomic and social subjects’ was established by the Prime Minister to develop plans and guidelines
for the transition from total lockdown to the wider reopening of the country.
The state of emergency had two important implications for the governance of the crisis. First,
to guarantee a quick response, the government was allowed to bypass the Parliament in the
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definition of legislative interventions. The government did so by approving so-called ‘decrees of
the Prime Minister’. This approach, although legally grounded in the Italian law, blurred the
boundaries between the executive and the legislative powers, de facto freezing the
Constitutional framework. For this reason, critics have questioned the decision by the govern-
ment to prolong the state of emergency first until the 31st October and then until the 31st
January 2021. Second, the state of emergency introduced the possibility of derogation of existing
procurement rules. Italy has very strict procurement rules and the national anti-corruption
agency is dedicated to check the legitimacy of procurement bids. The Department of Civil
Protection issued new procurement regulations to be valid mainly for the acquisition of PPE,
tests and ventilators, simplifying and accelerating the existing procedures.
5. National and regional policy responses
The first Italian COVID-19 positive patient was reported by the local health authorities in
Lombardy in Codogno (Lodi) on 20th February, followed by a number of additional cases in
the neighbouring areas of Emilia-Romagna and Veneto. On 21st February, the first COVID-19
death was recorded in Veneto. On 23rd February, the government reacted by introducing the
first movement and access/exit restrictions around these hotspots, known as ‘red zones’.
Additional restrictive measures for the whole of Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna,
Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Liguria and Piedmont followed on 25th February. Nationwide closure of
schools and universities was declared on 4th March, with additional social distancing measures
introduced on 9th March. A national partial lockdown was enforced on 11th March, affecting
bars, restaurants and recreational facilities, and culminating in the complete lockdown on
22nd March. Further restrictions to people’s movements were introduced on 25th March, except
for essential reasons (e.g. work, health and getting supplies).
Phase 1 of the Italian response to the emergency ended on 3rd May. This was followed by
phase 2 (4th May to 2nd June) during which most primary and secondary productive sectors,
professionals and private health care clinics and most retail shops, businesses and customer
services, resumed activities subject to sector-specific COVID-19 safety protocols (DPCM,
2020b). Previous restrictions to the free movement of citizens were lifted, within one’s region
of residence only. Further regulations, relaxing the existing lockdown measures, were adopted
nationwide and locally on 17th May (DPCM, 2020a). At this stage, a key role was played by the
Italian regions, which asked and obtained the right to set specific regional guidelines (de
Belvis et al., 2020).
As of 3rd June, all businesses reopened subject to aforementioned protocols and social distan-
cing rules. Free inter-regional movement of citizens was also reinstated, albeit with restrictions on
foreign travel. The wearing of face-masks (for ⩾6 years) outdoors, on public transport, in shop/
businesses became mandatory as well as keeping at least 1 m distance. Schools and universities
remained closed, but provided lessons through distance learning platforms (didattica a distanza)
and reopened only in September 2020 in a staggered way.
The outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 has unevenly affected Italian regions, with a clear north-south
gradient. These differences are mainly due to multiple independent entries of the virus in nor-
thern Italy, but may also be linked to the diverse set of policies implemented at the regional
level. In a companion paper, we discuss the differences and similarities of the Italian regional pol-
icy responses to COVID-19.
Similarly to many European countries and the USA, nursing homes (Residenza Sanitaria
Assistenziale, RSA) in Italy were particularly hit by the COVID-19 outburst (Berloto et al.,
2020; Ravizza, 2020). The excess mortality recorded in these settings seems to have followed
the regional pattern of exposure to and incidence of the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak. These excess
deaths, flagged up by a newspaper investigation, prompted the ISS to conduct a targeted survey,
which revealed that an average of 9.1% of all nursing homes’ residents died in Italy, with a peak of
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14% in Lombardy, between 1st February and 14th April, of which about 37.4% officially due to
COVID-19 (Istituto Superiore di Sanità, 2020).
A timeline with summary of the Italian national policy responses until the beginning of the
second outbreak in October is reported in Table 1.
6. Supply and demand side considerations of the COVID-19 response in Italy
Addressing the emergency required interventions on both the supply and demand of health care
services, in this section, we attempt a first assessment of the effects that the COVID-19 crisis had
on the Italian health care system, separately addressing supply-side and demand-side
considerations.
6.1 Supply-side considerations
The outbreak of a health crisis, especially at a scale like the COVID-19 crisis, puts even the best
health care systems under increased pressures and stress. In this section, we provide a summary of
the various measures introduced by the Italian central government to increase physical infrastruc-
ture capacity and address the emerging workforce shortages. However, the COVID-19 crisis has
also been instrumental in Italy, as in many other European countries, in fostering the adoption of
already existing digital technology by shifting to, and increasing the offer of, telemedicine, for
example.
6.1.1 Physical infrastructure and devices
Increasing production capacity is normally difficult in the short term, but what has been achieved
under the urgency of the COVID-19 crisis has been unprecedented for Italy. The expansion in the
supply side has entailed the rapid conversion or building of new hospital facilities and intensive
care units (ICU) for the care of COVID-19 patients, the procurement of massive quantities of
PPEs and other medical devices, and the hiring of additional health care workers.
6.1.2 Hospital facilities and ICU beds
One of the key bottlenecks of the recent COVID-19 crisis has been the lack of adequate ICU facil-
ities. The total number of ICU beds available in the SSN was increased by almost 65% during the
acute phase of the response, equivalent to about 3360 additional beds, from around 5300 in 2018
(Aimone Gigio et al., 2020). A further 30% expansion (almost 2400 beds) to the already expanded
ICU bed numbers has been planned (April 2020) which, if completed, will result in a more than
doubled overall pre-pandemic capacity. The growth in the number of ICU beds applied to all
regions, but not homogenously, as their needs were dependent on the epidemiological develop-
ment and severity of the COVID-19 outbreak in each region. The most recent increases in the
number and locations of COVID-19 infections have highlighted how the virus has travelled across
the whole length of the Italian peninsula, facilitated by the easing of the restrictions on movement
and the summer holiday season. This has brought to the fore that, despite the recent efforts in
increasing ICU capacity, this bottleneck still remains a critical issue in areas previously not
affected.
6.1.3 PPEs and medical devices
PPE, tests, contact tracing and other medical devices have been essential for enabling an effective
response and an efficient prevention of the spread. Since the start of the outbreak, the Civil
Protection Department has been coordinating the procurement and distribution of their supplies
to the regions. Despite an initial dramatic shortage in PPEs and other devices, 52 contracts with
national and international sellers were activated, for a total amount of about 357 million EUR, to
buy 350+ million masks, 7.2+ million gloves, 107,000+ protective suits, 100,000+ protective
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Table 1. Timeline of main COVID-19 events and responses undertaken by the Italian government
Date Main events and policy responses
31-01-2020 The Italian Council of Ministers declares a 6-month national emergency handing
the coordination of the COVID-19 emergency responses to the Head the Civil
Protection Department, following the detection of the first two COVID-19
positive people in Rome – two Chinese tourists travelling from Wuhan
21-02-2020 Detection of the first Italian COVID-19 positive patient in Lombardy, followed by
further cases in neighbouring regions of Emilia Romagna and Veneto
23-02-2020 The Government establishes two ‘lockdown (red) zones’ in both Lombardy and
Veneto, with the imposition of the first movement restrictions – travelling from
home must be justified on either health, work or ‘necessity’ grounds, e.g.
grocery shopping
25-02-2020 Further restrictive measures introduced in Emilia Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia,
Liguria, Lombardy, Piedmont and Veneto, incl. school closures in Friuli Venezia
Giulia, Lombardy and Veneto; whilst in other regions mentioned and Calabria,
schools closed only for 1 week
27-02-2020 A National Surveillance system, coordinated by the ISS was set up to oversee the
collection and collation of daily data from regions and from ISS’ National
Laboratory for SARS-CoV-2 through a web portal
01-03-2020 Creation of ‘red zones’: 10 municipalities in Lombardy, incl. Codogno (first town to
be put in lockdown); Veneto, incl. Vo’ (first town to be put in lockdown); other
provinces in Emilia Romagna, Marche and Liguria
04-03-2020 Closure of schools (all stages) and universities in the whole country
08-03-2020 Extension of lockdown restrictions to all Lombardy and large areas of Northern
Italy
09-03-2020 Partial lockdown restrictions extended to the whole of Italy
11-03-2020 Closure of restaurants/bars/pubs, except for essential services
17-03-2020 Decree (no. 18/20, ‘Cura Italia’), which included measure to bolster the SSN,
support employment and suspend fiscal obligations
22-03-2020 Interruption of all non-essential productive activities: complete lockdown
25-03-2020 Further restrictions imposed to people’s movements
27-03-2020 Peak in the reported number of daily deaths (969)
08-04-2020 Decree (n. 23/20, ‘Liquidità’), which included temporary measures to facilitate
access to loans, support business continuity and corporate liquidity and
measures to support export, internationalisation and business investment
04-05-2020 Reopening of most factories and various wholesale businesses, within pre-set
health safety protocols; possibility to visit close relatives
13-05-2020 Decree (n. 34/20, ‘Rilancio’), which included among others measures to support
and bolster hospitals and community-based health care services, increase the
number of nurses and reinforce medical education; support business activities
and further postpone fiscal obligations; support employment; extend school
closure
18-05-2020 Reopening of bar, restaurants, shops and some social activities (e.g. public
worship)
04-06-2020 Resuming of unrestricted inter-regional movement
15-06-2020 Resuming of recreational activities (e.g. cinemas and holiday camps)
29-07-2020 Extension of the state of emergency to 31st October
07-10-2020 Extension of the state of emergency to 31st January 2021
(Continued )
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glasses, 2500+ mechanical ventilators and 400 oxygen flow-meters (Dipartimento della
Protezione Civile, 2020). Tenders were launched and adjudicated in record time thanks to all sta-
keholders involved working around the clock. In addition to national supplies, regions, local
administrations and hospitals have also proceeded to direct purchases or procurement of these
goods through other channels (e.g. donations).
6.1.4 Workforce shortages
The effort to expand production capacity to be able to treat COVID-19 patients has been accom-
panied by the need to stop most elective health care activities and shift personnel to the acute and
intensive care of COVID-19 patients. This has meant also increasing working hours and length of
shifts for medical and nursing staff on duty. The emergency magnified, therefore, all the negative
consequences of the extensive underfunding of the Italian health care system and of the stop in
workforce turnover. Italy, as many other OECD countries, had been suffering from both work-
force shortages in the health care sector (CERGAS Bocconi, 2019) and an ageing medical work-
force (OECD, 2019) for some time. According to the OECD Health at a Glance Indicators
(OECD, 2019), in 2017 Italy had the largest share (55 vs 34% OECD average) of medical doctors
aged 55 and over among all OECD countries – a share which increased by 36% between 2000 and
2017. However, the issue of workforce shortages is especially true in the case of nurses. Italy has
in fact fewer nurses than nearly all western European countries (excluding Spain), with 5.8 nurses
per 1000 population compared to the European average of 8.5. And while Italy fares better com-
pared to their European peers in terms of medical professionals (4.0 doctors per 1000 population
compared with the EU average of 3.6), Italy has the lowest doctor-to-nurse ratio in the OECD (1.4
nurses per doctor) (OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2019). Despite
recent attempts by the Italian government to address this imbalance through increasing the num-
ber of students training to become nurse (the number increased to 13,000 in 2014 from a low
3100), the COVID-19 crisis has heightened the shortage of health care professionals suffered
by the SSN, with a pre-COVID-19 incidence of medical personnel of about 95 workers per
10,000 inhabitants (57 nurses, 19 doctors and 19 other technical staff).
The shortage of nurses and medical doctors front lining the emergency response, also in light
of the high number of nurses and medical professionals testing positive to COVID-19 (Bellizzi
et al., 2020), forced the Government to introduce several measures (DL, 2020a, 2020b; DPCM,
2020b) in order to face the rapidly rising demand of extra medical and other health care person-
nel. These measures included inter-regional redistribution of health care personnel, the re-hiring
of retired medics, nurses and other health care professionals, the creation of faster recruitment
tracks, the possibility to employ personnel on a freelance basis, the hiring of 20,000 health
care professionals (3.5% growth in the health workforce): the new hires comprised of more
than 4300 additional medical doctors, mainly anaesthesiologists; around 9700 nurses; and
6000 other health care professionals, mainly technical personnel (Aimone Gigio et al., 2020).
Further measures included the allocation of 250 million EUR to pay for staff overtime, the pos-
sibility for health care facilities to postpone retirement for eligible staff, the possibility for retired
doctors and nurses to return to practice on a voluntary basis (in the peak of the crisis in
Table 1. (Continued.)
Date Main events and policy responses
24-10-2020 (addressing the
second wave)
New restrictive measures to people’s movement (public squares to close at 9 pm,
curfew from 11 pm to 5 am in some regions); closures of restaurants/bars/pubs
from 6 pm; online schooling for 75% of secondary schools and university
students; closures of cinemas/theatres/music halls; only outdoor sports/activity
is allowed, except for elite sports
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Lombardy, more than 300 retired doctors and 500 retired nurses returned to practice on a vol-
untary basis), and to request the temporary enrolment of doctors and nurses from the armed
forces. Furthermore, hospitals were given the possibility to recruit on a freelance basis, doctors
and nurses not yet listed in the Medical Register and medical doctors and nurses practicing
abroad under EU directives have also been allowed to work in Italy on a temporary basis.
6.1.5 The shift to digital care
During the COVID-19 health crisis, as people were asked to shelter-in-place, health care systems
had to quickly move to other, innovative, forms of providing continued care to the population,
especially the elderly and those affected by chronic conditions. This lead to a forced acceleration
in the adoption of telemedicine, e-prescribing and similar practices. In Italy, especially for com-
munity care services, many regions activated a number of alternative provisions of health care,
such as teleconsultations, over a very short period of time. Telemedicine in Italy has been trad-
itionally delivered using several applications, poorly interconnected and with inconsistent local
and regional reimbursement practices. A temporary model to ease organisational aspects of
the implementation of telemedicine services during the emergency was issued by the ISS, albeit
without a specific national guidance on reimbursement codes, which caused the occurrence of
inter-regional differences. At the start of the pandemic, telemedicine was not explicitly covered
in the guaranteed LEA. Although private telemonitoring service providers reported a marked
increase in the use of direct-to-consumer services, the lack of a framework to reimburse telemedi-
cine services hindered wider-scale adoption by many public institutions (Petracca et al., 2020).
The COVID-19 crisis boosted the digitisation process in Italy, thanks to a relaxation of usual
red tapes (General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), procurement rules and organisational
resistance) in two ways. First, it helped revitalise dormant innovations, like e-prescription and
telemedicine already in place (Oliveira Hashiguchi, 2020), given the urgency of offering alterna-
tive ways to care for patients. This forced many previously reluctant or late ‘bloomer’ profes-
sionals to swiftly rely on telemedicine. Second, it led to further investments in technological
infrastructure necessary to tackle the challenges posed by the outbreak, such as the introduction
of mobile apps for controlling contact tracing or social distancing (Kummitha, 2020). The
Immuni app was introduced as a surveillance system, albeit not compulsory, in June 2020.
Two months later, only 4 million Italians (about 6% of the total population) had downloaded
it, against the minimum required threshold of 12 million (equivalent to 20% of total population
downloads or 60% of actual users) to guarantee its real effectiveness (Berra, 2020; Ferretti et al.,
2020). The most recent estimates report over 10 million downloads of the Immuni app since its
launch (Immuni Italia, 2020).
6.2 Demand-side considerations
The surge of COVID-19 patients who required medical care, and specifically intensive care, has
led almost everywhere to a rapid and extensive reprogramming of health care service delivery
(Remuzzi and Remuzzi, 2020). Most regional health care systems have seen the capacity to
treat surgical patients decrease dramatically because of the reallocation of resources to the pan-
demic response, and following government’s advice to suspend all non-urgent elective surgery
(Mayol and Fernández Pérez, 2020). In Italy, it has been estimated that a weekly total of
50,552 operations have been cancelled over the 12-week period of peak disruption. Figures
about cancellation rates have been placed at over 90% for benign surgeries (e.g. hip and knee
replacements), and between 20 and 29% for obstetrics and cancer surgery (CovidSurg
Collaborative, 2020). Similarly, outpatient procedures have been put on hold to free up staff
and resources to cope with COVID-19 patients. People with chronic diseases faced changes in
their usual standards of care and protocols (Kohli and Virani, 2020; Schrag et al., 2020).
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A report by Nomisma, an Italian business consultancy company, estimated that during the
COVID-19 emergency, 75% of elective surgeries was postponed. Out of 410,000 surgeries that
needed to be rescheduled, 135,700 (33% of the rescheduled surgeries and 79% of the specific
DRG) refer to surgeries of the muscular system and connective tissue; 54,000 (13% of the
rescheduled surgeries and 56% of the specific DRG) refers to surgeries of the cardiovascular sys-
tem and 39,800 (10% of the rescheduled surgeries and 65% of the specific DRG) refers to surger-
ies of the digestive system. The remaining 180,000 surgeries refer to the rest of the major
diagnostic groups, heavily affected by the emergency with between 70 and 97% rescheduled sur-
geries (Nomisma, 2020; quotidianosanità.it, 2020).
Finally, weeks of nationwide lockdown had also an effect on the number of people presenting
to A&E and subsequent emergency admissions. A retrospective analysis of patients admitted for
acute coronary syndrome at 15 hospitals in northern Italy during the early days of the COVID-19
outbreak revealed a mean rate of 13.3 emergency admissions per day compared to the 18.9 admis-
sions during the previous year (incidence rate ratio, 0.70; 95% CI, 0.63 to 0.78; p < 0.001)
(De Filippo et al., 2020).
7. Discussion
Was Italy unprepared? Answering this question is neither simple nor straightforward.
Italy was the first EU country to be hit by the COVID-19 epidemic. The initial response from
both the Italian national and regional governments, business organisations, as well as that the
general public was one of disbelief and inaction. However, the declaration of an emergency
state early on in the crisis enabled the national government to take immediate and executive deci-
sions to tackle the health crisis. In this midst, the decision to impose strict lockdown measures,
similar to those imposed by China, was a difficult exercise as it required dealing with the unpre-
cedented trade-off between enforcing measures that impinge on individual liberties in a demo-
cratic system, and the need to contain, or at least mitigate, the spread of the virus. Delays in
the enforcement of lockdown measures, especially in closing non-essential production activities,
ensued because of the need to acquire the consensus of both business industry and union repre-
sentatives (Bosa et al., 2020).
Moreover, the early phase of the emergency was characterised by low level of compliance with
and adherence to public health measures. An example of it is the mass flow of people who trav-
elled from the hardest hit northern regions towards the south, before the introduction of the
national lockdown in March, after this policy was prematurely leaked to the press, and which
may potentially have had a negative impact on the spread of the outbreak in previously unaffected
areas (Bosa et al., 2020). However, most southern regions took immediate steps to deal with the
flux of people coming from the northern regions, by for example introducing a 14 day self-
isolation period for people travelling from the hardest hit regions. This may have allowed
these regions to keep their initial numbers of positive COVID-19 cases low(er) and to ‘flatten
the curve’ earlier than northern regions (Bosa et al., 2020). The second wave of the pandemic
is not sparing southern regions, revealing pre-existing weaknesses in their models of health
care organisation and delivery.
Italy’s multi-level governance structure and its decentralised health care system have allowed
local governments (both regional and municipalities) to tailor their responses to the needs of
their population and to proactively adopt further measures as required by the epidemiological
development of the COVID-19 outbreak in their respective areas. However, we think that ‘this
pluralism might have impeded faster and more integrated responses, and may have fuelled inter-
governmental tensions’ (Bosa et al., 2020).
The lack of a brushed up emergency plan, the mismanagement of ‘patient 1’ and other initial
cases, insufficient transparency in communication and a surveillance system initially ill-suited to
allow for the central coordination of the national emergency, all conspired to make the first
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response to the COVID-19 crisis mainly a hospital-centred response, especially in Lombardy.
This proved to be suboptimal, as revealed by the high incidence and high rate at which the
virus spread, and the subsequent high need for ventilators and intensive care beds. Italy appeared
to be under-equipped with respect to both, which has been suggested to have put the country
under great(er) risk during this crisis. A study by Remuzzi and Remuzzi (2020), for example, esti-
mated that by 29th March between 9 and 11% of COVID-19 patients required ICU care. Given
the number of COVID-19 cases was at the time equal to 73,800, the authors stated that around
7380 ICU beds were needed, a number well exceeding the ICU bed capacity at the time. This may
have forced ICU specialists to prioritise patients more likely to benefit and survive.
Furthermore, in the urgency of addressing COVID-19 patients in a hospital setting (with the
doubling of ICU beds in the span of a mere 15 days), the national and regional governments
might have been slow in organising an equally effective response at the primary/community
care level. The high level of infected general practitioners (as compared to all health care profes-
sionals) testifies the lower level of attention that this part of the health care system received in the
overall COVID-19 emergency response strategy (FNOMCeO, 2020).
However early on in the pandemic (March 2020), the central government required the creation
of special units (Unità Speciali di Continuità Assistenziale, USCA, 1 every 50,000 inhabitants) to
manage COVID-19 patients, who did not require hospital care, to be followed in the community,
including the monitoring of people in home-isolation (DL, 2020a, 2020b). However, their intro-
duction by the single regions has not been uniform with a minimum of five USCAs activated in
Molise and PA Bolzen against the maximum number of 250 USCAs in Lazio. Lombardy, the
region that has historically invested the least on primary/community care, has only activated
157 USCAs against the scheduled 202 (Fassari, 2020).
Another important issue – raising questions on the appropriateness and the timing of the
containment measures implemented in Italy, and especially in the Lombardy region – is in
the number of deaths in nursing homes. In Lombardy, for example, to ease pressure on hospi-
tals already working at full capacity, regional decision makers proposed to use RSA beds to treat
non-critical COVID-19 patients, provided that these patients could be properly isolated
(Lombardy Region, 2020). At the time of writing, these decisions are under judicial investiga-
tions to establish whether they have contributed to the excess deaths observed in nursing homes
in Lombardy (Serra, 2020). Furthermore, RSA’s staff and carers have suffered from massive
shortage of PPE, similarly to other countries (Berloto et al., 2020), and from a widespread
lack of appropriate training. Finally, the COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the need to review
the way social care is organised and delivered in Italy, and the need for a regulatory body
responsible for controlling the quality of services provided by RSAs, which does not currently
exist (Ravizza, 2020).
Disruption or deliberate delays in seeking needed care may have raised concerns, anxiety, fear
and may have negatively impacted the mental health of patients, especially those in vulnerable
and fragile groups (Citoni et al., 2020). A silent sub-epidemic of people who needed hospital
care but did not dare to show up may well rival the carnage directly produced by COVID-19
– a collateral damage from delay of less urgent care that truly could not wait, with potentially
thousands of missed diagnoses who will deteriorate or appear as late presentations or inoperable.
The toll of unaddressed health problems is accompanied by a mounting backlog of procedures
that could cost billions to the SSN and may require a substantial amount of extra health care
workforce input to bring it under control (Rosenbaum, 2020).
Finally, it still needs to be investigated what the effects on access to care and the quality of care
provided by the move to digital health care provision are, given that not all types of patients nor
all types of clinical conditions are amenable to be treated as such.
Despite this unprecedented injection of digitalisation, there are still professionals and patients
who still have to catch-up – an issue termed ‘The Great Digital divide’ – making it a priority to
bring people who are ‘digitally excluded online’ (Capgemini Research Institute, 2020).
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8. Conclusions
The first wave of the COVID-19 outbreak and related deaths were mainly concentrated in the
northern regions, the second wave has spread more widely geographically, facilitated by the easing
of the lockdown restrictions, especially on movement, implemented in June and subsequent sum-
mer holidays. Current government instructions are based on a three-tier regional risk assessment.
At the time of writing, Italy was still experiencing a daily rise of COVID-19 cases and related
deaths, which led to the re-introduction of movement restrictions, curfews and early daily clo-
sures of businesses. When and how these restrictions will impact curbing and flattening the
curve is a question that cannot be answered yet.
The COVID-19 pandemic has hit the country after years of strict spending reviews and severe
cost containment measures (at least since the 2008 economic crisis). These have cut down
resources to the health system and hospital capacity, with said cost-containment measures shift-
ing de facto the burden of health care finance from national and regional governments to house-
holds (e.g. increasing user charges), and setting tighter budget constraints for pharmaceutical
public expenditure, in a context of increasing socioeconomic inequalities in both health care
use and financing (Citoni et al., 2020).
In 2019, the Italian government started to redress the financing of the SSN, increasing its fund-
ing to 114.5 billion EUR (+1.59% increase in nominal terms), with further forecasted increases of
2 billion EUR and 1.5 billion EUR for 2020 and 2021, respectively (Citoni et al., 2020; de Belvis
et al., 2020). Moreover, since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent eco-
nomic crisis, the government approved a series of economic measures aimed at supporting several
sectors of the Italian economy, including health care (de Belvis et al., 2020).
The main upcoming challenges, besides adequate and sustainable funding of the SSN, for the
Ministry of Health, the national government and the regions are how to reorganise the SSN, pos-
sibly even in its governance; what priorities to set to provide and strengthen health care services
(e.g. prevention/public health, primary/community care); how to overcome workforce shortages
in the medium and long term, assuring the right mix of competences within the SSN; and how to
modernise the physical infrastructures of the health care system; all the while keeping in mind,
that reinforcing the country’s preparedness to future epidemics can no longer be postponed.
Conflict of interest. None.
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